

**TAB**

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CONSIDERATIONS ON A SEPARATE AGREEMENT BANNING  
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN SATELLITES

Arguments Pro:

1. The USSR is unlikely to accept such a proposal, but the US record of willingness to make such an agreement would bring favorable world reactions.
2. It is easier to prevent armament of space than to get agreement to subsequent disarmament after the arms race had been extended to outer space. An agreement along the lines proposed by the US could make a positive contribution to the national security in that it would lend impetus to the whole disarmament field, and would help curb the arms race in an area of potential military significance and reduce the threat of technological surprise, in an area where the Soviet Union, by virtue of its greater payload capabilities, enjoys present advantage. 11P  
not
3. Since the US has committed itself to examining such a proposal, reversal of our position would raise doubts as to the sincerity of US public statements and disarmament positions, and perhaps adversely affect other political interest as well.
4. If we do not take the initiative in a form, place, and at an early time of our own choosing, the Soviets or some other country may advance a proposal including a ban on reconnaissance, perhaps in the UN General Assembly. This would be distinctly disadvantageous in terms of the support we could rally to our position. 200  
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5. Reconnaissance vehicles would not be included in the ban, and such further compromise of secrecy of our reconnaissance program as might result from Soviet claims that inspection for nuclear weapons revealed presumptive evidence of reconnaissance would be largely offset by their very acceptance of an agreement which did not ban reconnaissance.
6. The Soviet disarmament proposal itself provides for a ban on weapons in orbit and does not include a ban on reconnaissance. Consequently, we are on good ground for opposing Soviet arguments for adding reconnaissance and for countering their efforts to place on us the blame for failure to reach an agreement, if that should be their tactic.
7. Agreement on such a measure would create a political context in which Soviet hostile countermeasures would be more politically costly to them, even though advance notification might assist hostile countermeasures. ?

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Arguments Con:

1. The USSR would use the occasion of debate on such a ban to attack reconnaissance satellites, and might try to blame failure of agreement on US refusal to include a ban on reconnaissance.

2. The Soviets might decide it was important enough to them to stop our reconnaissance program actually to agree to an inspected ban on weapons plus reconnaissance uses of outer space. In such a case, if the US refused to agree we would be virtually alone in defending our stand; if we agreed, we would give up the whole key reconnaissance satellite program.

3. If the USSR agreed to our proposal for a ban on nuclear weapons in orbit, excluding reconnaissance, they would learn much about our reconnaissance operations (even though the degree of inspection would not provide details such as the resolution of the photography), and would be aided in physical active and passive countermeasures by advance notification of launchings.

4. Does it provide any real information about our weapons capabilities? (and the USSR's)  
Meaning many weapons

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